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Imperative?
In 1926 Fritz Jahr, Protestant pastor and German pedagogue, was the first, as far 
as we know, to use the term “bioethics”, a term that is a part of today’s common 
lexicon1. However, it is most surprisingly, the peculiar - or particularly widespread - 
meaning that this term acquires in Jahr’s article. “Bioethics”, in Jahr’s opinion, is the 
branch of ethics that states the existence of “ethical responsibilities not only towards 
human beings but towards all living creatures.”2 To ground the legitimacy of such a 
principle, Jahr refers to modern psychology, which was at his time physiology-based 
and attributed a “soul” (Seele, in German) to every living being3. It is clear from 
the context that the word Seele (the German equivalent of the Greek word psyché), 
or “psyche” or “soul”, has here no metaphysical or theological sense, but it should 
be understood as “inner life”, which can be scientifically measured in any living 
creature, or as “consciousness” in a broad sense. However, Jahr doesn’t focus on this 
specific point, so, consequently, his thesis is not adequately grounded. Implicitly 
referring to Kant, Jahr enunciates his “bioethical imperative”, which prescribes to 
treat every living being, “if possible”, as “an end in itself ”4.
Jahr is thoroughly convinced that the knowledge of the natural world (namely, the 
knowledge about living beings as having and manifesting Seele) ought to be at the 
root of any ethical reflection. He assumes that ethics is the essential corollary of 
1  F. Jahr, “Wissenschaft vom Leben und Sittenlehre. Alte Erkenntnisse in neuem Gewande”, in Die Mittelschule. 
Zeitschrift für das gesamte mittlere Schulwesen, 1926 (40), pp. 604-605 (15 December 1926); English transl. in F. 
Jahr, Essays in Bioethics 1924-1948, ed. and transl. by I. M. Miller and H. N. Sass, Berlin 2013, pp. 17-22.
2  F. Jahr, Essays in Bioethics 1924-1948, p. 17.
3  Idem.
4  Idem, p. 20.
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knowledge; otherwise moral principles derive from the truth. From his Christian 
point of view, this means that any human action is correct only if it is in accordance 
with the universal Order that God has established once and for all (the reference 
to Francis of Assisi is very significant); men should only support the inherent 
“destination”5 (Bestimmung) of things, respecting and protecting their true nature 
or essence (s. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, qq. 18-20). This “essence” 
must be established in a scientifically rigorous way and, for this purpose, Jahr uses 
the results of modern experimental psychology. Only within this philosophical-
theological horizon he can wish that scientific (descriptive) disciplines act even as 
moral (prescriptive) disciplines6.
This “traditional” perspective is odd to us, since today human beings seem to be able 
to alter the “nature” and consequently the “destination” of living beings (genetic 
engineering). What has previously constituted the unquestionable criterion to judge 
over the morality of human actions, it has now become the object or matter of 
human actions. Rather than the mere investigation of the reality, nowadays scientific 
research pursues the ability to intervene successfully on reality; the pursuit of truth, 
i.e. of “nature” of things, is today from the start clearly subordinated to the pursuit 
of power over things, especially because the latter, once acquired, makes it possible to 
redesign and transform the first (so that, also in this specific sense, the strong meaning 
of “truth” seems less significant today). But then, the questions come naturally: 
which rules should govern this second form of action? What ethics should regulate the 
alteration of what has traditionally constituted the criterion and the foundation of ethics?
“Bioethics” today deals with such thorny questions. The term apparently coined by 
Jahr generally means the ethical reflection applied to scientific research on life and 
to experimentations on living organisms. In so far as the development of technology 
has greatly increased the potential of these activities, bioethics is “the critical 
conscience of technological civilization” (s. A. Pessina, Bioetica. L’uomo sperimentale, 
Milano 1999). This critical conscience is mostly important, since our “civilization” 
seems to follow the technical imperative: “Develop indefinitely the technological 
apparatus and subordinate everything – life, environment and values  – to the needs 
of this development!”. In the presence of this process (and of the manifold interests 
involved in it), the rights of living beings are not always safe, and therefore need to 
be programmatically preserved. The repercussions of this (will of ) protection on the 
discipline of law are obvious.
The new terminology proposed by Jahr was not successful; that is why we have only 
recently “discovered” his contributions. Nevertheless, one may wonder if his theory 
5  Idem, p. 18.
6  Idem, p. 22.
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may help us to tackle some questions related to the current meaning of “bioethics”. 
Take, for example, experiments on human embryos. It is clear that, if the experiments 
do not benefit (in the long term) the embryos on which they are carried out, these 
embryos are considered and treated only as “means” and not as “ends in themselves”. 
From this point of view, Jahr’s imperative of bioethics peremptorily prohibits 
such a practice. However, Jahr also mentions expressly “the struggle for life” as a 
principle, which limits the bioethical act in general and “our moral duties towards 
our neighbors”7. It is precisely this limitation that the formulation of the imperative 
of bioethics alludes to, through the expression “if possible”. Jahr is not so naive or 
“idealistic” as he might seem. In conclusion: experimentation on embryos, to the 
extent that it makes a decisive contribution to the existence of those who are able to 
take advantage of the resulting knowledge and potentials, is in some ways similar to 
an episode of the inevitable struggle for life. From this point of view, Jahr’s bioethical 
imperative would not be so peremptorily and instantly censuring. Perhaps just in this 
(albeit implicit) problematizing attitude, which does not lead to a univocal solution 
to such a complex problem, lies the topicality of his proposal.
7  Idem, p. 20.
